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Abstract
While the number of established maritime boundaries steadily increases, there are many
situations where delimitation disputes between neighboring States remains unsettled. In the
latter situations, States may face the existence of a hydrocarbon deposit that is located in an
area where their maritime claims overlap. The presence of such a deposit inevitably creates
a range of intricate legal (and political) issues. One of the issues is related to the question of
whether States can unilaterally authorize hydrocarbon activities with respect to this deposit and,
if so, what type of conduct is allowed in undelimited maritime areas. This article seeks to find an
answer to the mentioned question.
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I. INTRODUCTION
States usually conduct hydrocarbon activities in undelimited
maritime areas under two scenarios. Under the first scenario, States
may conclude an interim arrangement that would make exploration
and/or exploitation of petroleum resources possible.1 Examples include
provisional arrangements signed in the Gulf of Guinea between Nigeria
and São Tomé and Príncipe,2 in the Timor Sea between Australia and
It is worth noting that States may also agree on a moratorium on all or some petroleum operations within an undelimited maritime area. For example, Israel and Lebanon appears to conduct no hydrocarbon activities in a clearly defined disputed area
between them in the Levant Sea. Prior to a delimitation agreement concluded in 2010
between Norway and Russia, there was also a moratorium on all operations in an area
of overlapping claims in the Barents Sea.
2
Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao
Tome and Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in
respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Two States, Abuja, 21 February 2001, entered into force16 January 2003, reproduced in: International Maritime
Boundaries, edited by Jonathan I. Charney, David A. Colson and Lewis M. Alexander,
1
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Timor-Leste,3 and in the Gulf of Thailand between Malaysia and
Thailand.4 The second scenario relates to the situation where States
unilaterally authorize hydrocarbon activities to be carried out in
undelimited maritime areas. This article addresses the second scenario
because it can be observed in many geographical regions around the
world. There are a number of examples where States, despite the
existence of an area of overlapping maritime claims, have unilaterally
permitted some exploration and/or exploitation activities in such area.5
The Somalia v. Kenya case,6 that is subject of ongoing litigation before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), exemplifies these types of
situations.
The main legal issue is what, if any, hydrocarbon activities can be
unilaterally conducted in a maritime area the legal status of which needs
to be determined and that is not covered by a temporal arrangement.
Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the United Nations Convention on the
volume 5, 2005, pp. 3649-3682.
3
Timor Sea Treaty between the Government of East Timor and the Government
of Australia, 2258 UNTS 3, opened for signature 20 May 2002, entered into force
2 April 2003.. It is important to note that according to the latest Press Release issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on behalf of the Conciliation Commission
between Timor-Leste and Australia on 15 October 2017, the Parties have reached
a draft treaty that delimits the maritime boundary between them in the Timor Sea
and addresses the legal implications for the joint management scheme. Nevertheless, the text of this draft treaty is not available at the time of the writing. See, the
PCA’s Press Release of 15 October 2017 at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/175/2017/10/20171015-Press-Release-No-10-EN.pdf
4
Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters relating to the Establishment
of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, Kuala Lumpur, 30 May 1990. The text is
available at the Joint Authority webpage: https://www.mtja.org/rules.php Prior to the
Agreement, the States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment
of the Joint Authority, Chang Mai, 21 February 1979. Available at the same webpage.
5
It is also important to note that there are examples where neighboring States have
abstained from/suspended hydrocarbon activities in disputed areas, following a mutual agreement or a protest from one of the States. Such examples can be found in paras. 9.46-9.48 (with the relevant footnotes) of the Côte d’Ivoire’s Counter-Memorial,
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case. The Counter-Memorial is available at https://www.itlos.
org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/pleadings/Counter_Memorial_final_Vol.I_Eng_TR.pdf
6
International Court of Justice, “Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia
v. Kenya)”, The Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case can also be mentioned in this respect.

157

Unilateral Hydrocarbon Activities In Undelimited Maritime Areas

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)7 contain key rules applicable in areas of
overlapping claims to the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf. Paragraph 3 of these articles provides States with two obligations:
first, to make every effort to arrive at a provisional arrangement of a
practical nature and, second, to make every effort not to jeopardize or
hamper the reaching of a future delimitation (the obligation is further
referred as an obligation not to jeopardize or hamper).
This article examines the second obligation because when it is
impossible to reach provisional arrangements as those mentioned
above, this obligation becomes “the only reliable legal device that
can regulate the conduct of States [in undelimited maritime areas]”.8
The relevance of this obligation has increased even more in light of
the recent dictum of the Special Chamber (SC) in the Ghana v. Côte
d’Ivoire case9 that “maritime activities undertaken by a State in an area
of the continental shelf which had been attributed to another State by an
international judgement cannot be considered to be in violation of the
sovereign rights of the latter if those activities were carried out before
the judgement was delivered and if the area concerned as the subject of
claims made in good faith by both States”.10 Thus, the obligation not to
jeopardize or hamper seems to be the main tool to assess the legality of
unilateral hydrocarbon operations in undelimited maritime area.
Although paragraph 3 imposes no moratorium on economic
activities in undelimited areas, it is not altogether clear which types of
petroleum activities can be regarded as having the effect of jeopardizing
or hampering and, therefore, prohibited. To date, there is only one case,
the Guyana v. Suriname case,11 where the Arbitral Tribunal (Tribunal)
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 UNTS 3,
opened for signature,10 December 1982, entered into force16 November 1994.
8
International Tribunal on The Law of The Sea, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire)
Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, ITLOS Case number 23, para. 18.
9
International Tribunal on The Law of The Sea, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire),
Judgement, ITLOS Case No. 23, 23 September 2017.
10
Ibid., para. 592.
11
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article
287 and In Accordance With Annex VII of The United Nations Convention on The
Law of The Sea (Guyana v. Suriname), Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 17 September
7
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considered the meaning and scope of the obligation not to jeopardize or
hamper in detail. The SC in the Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case fell short in
this respect.12 In the Guyana v. Suriname case, the Tribunal introduced
a standard of “permanent physical change to the marine environment”13
that, in general terms, implies that activities which satisfy this standard
shall not be permitted in undelimited maritime areas and those which do
not, are to be allowed. This article discusses whether the introduction of
such a standard can provide a certain degree of certainty for coastal States
and private petroleum companies wishing to undertake exploration and
exploitation activities in undelimited maritime areas.
This article begins by determining the temporal scope of the obligation
not to jeopardize or hamper. Hereafter, it addresses the obligation’s
substantive scope, including its judicial application in case law. The
standard introduced by the Tribunal in the Guyana v. Suriname case
is analyzed in detail. The article also examines the role of provisional
measures in interpreting of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.
Finally, the article concludes by providing some final observations.
II. THE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO
JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER
Paragraph 3 begins with the phrase “pending agreement as provided
for in paragraph 1”. Hereinafter, it introduces a second phrase “during
this transitional period”. Logically, the first phrase relates to the
obligation to enter into provisional arrangements, while the second
phrase is directly linked to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.14
However, the first phrase seems to govern the moment when both these
obligations are triggered. This section considers the meaning of these
two phrases
2007.
12
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire), Judgement paras. 629-634.
13
Ibid., Chapter VIII (B) (2).
14
David Anderson and Youri van Logchem, “Rights and Obligations in Areas of
Overlapping Maritime Claims”, in: The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea,
edited by S. Jayakumar, T. Koh, R. C. Beckman, 2014, p. 209.
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A. “PENDING [A MARITIME BOUNDARY] AGREEMENT”
It is unclear when a future delimitation agreement is considered
to be “pending”. A number of legal commentators have emphasized
that the existence of the obligations does not depend on whether
or not delimitation negotiations have been initiated.15 Indeed, the
affirmation that the moment of the emergence is somehow associated
with the negotiation process may detract from the significance of these
obligations. It is likely there would be a considerable time difference
between the moments when the negotiations start and when the maritime
claims of neighboring states (potentially) overlap. Being dependent on
whether negotiations have been initiated, the obligations would not be
in force until the start of negotiations and would cease, if one of the
parties would have refused to negotiate, or if the negotiations reached a
deadlock or were discontinued.16
The point in time at which the obligations stemming from paragraph
3 emerge is generally tied to the situation where it is apparent that
maritime claims to a particular area do, or might potentially, overlap.17
It elicits the question of the circumstances in which the existence of
overlapping claims becomes obvious. Unlike claims to an EEZ, states
are not required to make an express claim to a continental shelf.18
Undoubtedly, the obligations would arise when neighboring states,
through diplomatic channels or by other means, have explicitly
acknowledged that an area of overlapping maritime claims exists,
giving rise to a need for delimitation.19
Rainer Lagoni, “Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements”,
The American Journal of International Law, 1984, volume 78 (2), pp. 357 and 364;
Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, United Nations Convention of the Law of the
Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume II, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003, p.
815.
16
Rainer Lagoni, “Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements”,
The American Journal of International Law, 1984, volume 78 (2), p. 364.
17
Youri van Logchem, “The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas”,
in: The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, edited by C. Schofield, S. Lee and M.-S.
Kwon, 2014, p. 178.
18
UNCLOS, article 77 (3).
19
David Anderson and Youri van Logchem, “Rights and Obligations in Areas of
Overlapping Maritime Claims”, in: The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea,
edited by S. Jayakumar, T. Koh, R. C. Beckman, 2014, p. 209.
15
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However, there is less clarity in the event when State A has made its
claims known or has even proceeded to exercise its (alleged) sovereign
rights to explore and exploit, while State B has raised no objection to
that.20 It is reasonable to assume that the absence of reaction does not
activate the obligations under paragraph 3 because it is unlikely that
State A can unilaterally identify where exactly maritime claims of State
A and State B overlap. The question arises as to whether the obligations
are triggered when State B, after a certain period of time, starts to
contest the position or activities of State A (for example, because State
A has discovered a large-volume petroleum resource or State B due to
different reasons has not been able to protest) on the basis that State B
was not obligated to proclaim its rights over the continental shelf.
The Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case exemplifies the mentioned scenario.
In this case, Ghana had authorized different petroleum operations in
a maritime area for a long time before Côte d’Ivoire started to react
(beginning with 2009). Ghana did so in the belief that a de facto
maritime boundary was established and Côte d’Ivoire tacitly consented
to Ghana’s petroleum activities. Leaving aside the SC’s conclusions
that there was no tacit delimitation agreement between Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire and that Côte d’Ivoire was not estopped from objecting,21 it
is notable that the SC was of the view that Ghana’s obligation not to
jeopardize or hamper clearly arose in 2009 when the existence of a
delimitation dispute and the location of the disputed area became, or
should have become, obvious to Ghana.22
In other words, it means that in a similar situation when State B
breaks its silence and starts to object, State A must pay due attention to
the obligations set forth in paragraph 3, even if it believes that State B
is estopped from objecting. State B may indeed have good reasons why
it could not react earlier (e.g., internal conflicts that prevented State B
from focusing on other issues). The subsequent issue relates to the legal
consequences attached to the moment of triggering of paragraph 3: for
example, whether State A would be compelled to halt its hydrocarbon
activities in the contested maritime area or to share the benefits
20
21
22

BIICL’s Report, p. 32, para. 108.
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case, Parts VII and VIII.
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case, paras. 588, 630 and 631.
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received prior to State B’s objection. The Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case
demonstrates how difficult it will be to suspend ongoing activities, but
possible to freeze new petroleum activities.23
The opening phrase of paragraph 3 is also intended to determine
the moment of termination of the obligation to seek provisional
arrangements. The French and Russian texts of the UNCLOS clearly
refer to the date of conclusion of a delimitation agreement.24 However,
it may be a time difference between the date of conclusion of a treaty
and its date of entry into force.25 Moreover, there is always a risk that
the adopted delimitation treaty will never come into force. In this
respect, the rules stemming from the law of the treaties are applicable.26
A delimitation agreement may apply provisionally, pending its entry
into force.27 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) imposes upon States an obligation to refrain from acts, which
might defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into
force. In other words, if a delimitation treaty is signed, but is not yet in
force, the Parties to that treaty are nevertheless bound by their accord
on where the delimitation line lies. Following this logic, the obligation
to seek provisional arrangements ceases once a final delimitation
agreement is reached (as long as neither contracting Party attempts to
withdraw from the agreement), since there is no need for delimitation.
Section V (D).
UNCLOS, arts. 74 (3) and 84 (3). French text: “En attendant la conclusion de
l’accord visé au paragraphe l, …”. Russian text: “До заключения соглашения, как
предусматривается в пункте 1, …”.
25
Delimitation agreements may enter into force upon signature. However, they are
usually subject to ratification or approval. See, Handbook on the Delimitation of
Maritime Boundaries, DOALS, 2000, p. 82; David Anderson, “Negotiating Maritime
Boundary Agreements: A Personal View”, in: Maritime Delimitation, edited by R.
Lagoni and D. Vignes, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 139.
26
The governing law is Part II of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155
UNTS 331.
27
VCLT, art. 25. For example, a delimitation agreement between the USA and the
USSR concluded in 1990 (Agreement between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary, 1 June 1990) is not
in force, but the two governments agreed to abide by the terms of that delimitation
agreement. See, Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to abide by the terms of the Maritime Boundary Agreement
of 1 June 1990, pending entry into force, 2262 UNTS 407.
23
24
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It is interesting to note that paragraph 4 explicitly mentions “an
agreement in force”.28 Therefore, it could be argued that articles 74 and
83 of the UNCLOS on their entirety refer to delimitation agreements
that are in force and while an agreement is not in force, the delimitation
is not fully effected.29 Consequently, the obligations provided by
paragraph 3 would continue to apply until the date of entry into force of
a delimitation treaty.30
Moreover, it is important to note that the term ‘agreement’ is employed
in a broader context, covering not only the situation where states have
agreed on a maritime boundary, but also where the delimitation dispute
has been settled by a court or tribunal.31 The question is whether, in the
latter situation, the obligation would cease once some form of dispute
settlement procedure has been invoked, or once the court or tribunal
has decided that it has jurisdiction, or only when the court or tribunal
has delivered its final judgement on the merits.32 It seems reasonable
to suggest that the obligation to seek provisional arrangements is
terminated once the determination of a maritime boundary is made by
a judicial body. However, there might be a situation where one of the
Parties to a delimitation dispute does not accept the final decision.33 In
UNCLOS, arts. 74 and 84 (emphasis added). For example, the Russian text of
the UNCLOS refers to “действующее соглашение” (this phrase is different from
“заключенное соглашение” within the meaning of para. 3 - “an agreement concluded between States”).
29
BIICL’s Report, p. 32, para. 109.
30
Ibid.
31
UNCLOS, arts. 74 (2) and 84 (2).
32
BIICL’s Report, p. 32, para. 109.
33
For example, Croatia issued a statement declaring that it does not accept the Final Award of 29 June 2017 in the Croatia v. Slovenia case (available at http://www.
mvep.hr/en/info-servis/press-releases/,28223.html ). The text of the Final Award is
available at https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2172 . In the Cameroon
v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening case, Nigeria initially did not accept the
Judgement delivered by the ICJ in 2002 (available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/94/094-20021010-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf ). The process of the Judgement’s implementation took more than 5 years. See in detail Hilary V. Lukong, The CameroonNigeria Border Dispute: Management and Resolution, 1981-2011, 2011, chapter 5. In
2010, Cameroon and Nigeria signed an agreement on joint development of a number
of cross-border petroleum deposits (the text of the agreement is not available). See,
“Cameroon and Nigeria agree joint development along part of their maritime boundary”, IBRU news, 15 March 2011. Available at https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/
28
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this situation, it is logical to assume that the obligation continues to
apply until the decision is fully implemented.
Thus, this subsection has considered the temporal scope of the
obligation to arrive at provisional arrangements of a practical nature.
The moment of triggering the obligation depends on the circumstances
surrounding each delimitation case. While in some circumstances it is
clear that the obligation has arisen, in other circumstances this moment
is more difficult to establish. The obligation ceases upon the conclusion
of a maritime boundary agreement or the determination of a boundary
by a judicial body that is challenged by neither Party.

B. “DURING THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD”
As regards the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, articles 74 (3)
and 84 (3) of the UNCLOS stipulate that it lasts “during this transitional
period”. Nevertheless, the articles provide no explanation of what the
phrase ‘during this transitional period’ implies. The previous section
has discussed the circumstances under which the obligation to negotiate
provisional arrangements arises. The same applies to the obligation not
to jeopardize or hamper.
The subsequent question is when the transitional period ends.34
The logical conclusion is that paragraph 3 refers to the period until
a maritime boundary is agreed by the Parties or is determined by a
court or tribunal. The SC in the Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case offered the
similar reading of paragraph 3.35 At the same time, the SC has drawn
a distinction between two scenarios within the transitional period: the
scenario where a provisional arrangement is reached and the scenario
where no such provisional arrangement exists.36 It is not very clear what
the SC desired to show by this distinction: whether the obligation not
to jeopardize or hamper is terminated once a provisional arrangement
boundary_news/?itemno=11734&rehref=
34
The statement of the Conciliation Commission in the case between Timor-Leste
and Australia is not very useful in this respect. In its decision on Australia’s objection
to competence, the Commission stated that the transitional period is a period “pending
a final delimitation and the provisional arrangements of a practical nature”, para. 97.
Available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1921
35
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case, para. 630.
36
Ibid.
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is concluded or whether the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper
becomes supplementary where a provisional arrangement is in place.
The latter interpretation is preferable for a number of reasons.
A provisional arrangement rarely regulates all activities in the
disputed maritime area or do not always apply to the entire area of
overlapping claims. Logically, if a provisional arrangement solely
covers fisheries activities or a part of a disputed area, the obligation
not to jeopardize or hamper would be applicable to other activities,
such as hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, or to other parts
of the contested area. Against this backdrop, D. Anderson and Y. van
Logchem assert that the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper applies
while a provisional arrangement is in place, as well as before such an
arrangement is concluded.37 Their approach is most appropriate because
no provisional arrangement can cover all acts which may amount to
jeopardizing or hampering the reaching a final delimitation.
Thus, it appears reasonable that the duration of the obligation
not to jeopardize or hamper is equated with the temporal scope of
the obligation to seek provisional arrangements. In other words, the
two obligations are triggered once State A has realized that a certain
maritime area is also claimed by State B and cease when a delimitation
agreement (between State A and State B) is concluded or when a
maritime boundary is established by a judicial body. There is no reason
to attach a different meaning to the phrase ‘during this transitional
period’ only on the basis that the period it refers to is already covered
by the paragraph 3’s opening phrase.
III.THE CORE CONTENT OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO
JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER
It is important to note that the requirement to “make every effort”
applies not only to the obligation to enter into provisional arrangements,
but also to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a
David Anderson and Youri van Logchem, “Rights and Obligations in Areas of
Overlapping Maritime Claims”, in: The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea,
edited by S. Jayakumar, T. Koh, R. C. Beckman, 2014, p. 209.
37
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final delimitation.38 It would be a significant difference if the UNCLOS
had stipulated an absolute obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.
However, for the purpose of convenience, the considered obligation is
further abbreviated in this article as ‘the obligation not to jeopardize or
hamper’. The obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is an obligation of
conduct, not of result.39
Paragraph 3 does not define the terms ‘jeopardize’ and ‘hamper’.
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the verb ‘jeopardize’
means “put (someone or something) into a situation in which there is
a danger of loss, harm, or failure”, while ‘hamper’ means “hinder or
impede the movement or progress of”.40 Thus, the obligation not to
jeopardize or hamper appears to mean that States, having overlapping
claims regarding a certain maritime area, must make every effort not
to engage in activities that might endanger the reaching of a final
agreement on delimitation or impede the progress of negotiations to
that end.41
It is clear that the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper does
not necessarily exclude all activities unilaterally conducted within
undelimited maritime areas, but rather those that would jeopardize or
hamper the reaching of a final delimitation agreement.42 However, it is
completely unclear which types of activities are to be regarded as having
the effect of jeopardizing or hampering. In this article, the main question
is the conduct of what unilateral activities surrounding hydrocarbon
exploration and exploitation is likely to breach the obligation not to
jeopardize or hamper.43
Guyana v. Suriname case, para. 465; Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case, para. 629.
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case, para. 629. See also Responsibilities and obligations
of States with respect to activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011,
ITLOS Reports 2011, para. 110.
40
It is taken from the BIICL’s Report, para. 75, p. 22. The Report refers to the Concise
Oxford Dictionary (10th edition, OUP 1999), pp. 759 and 644, respectively.
41
BIICL’s Report, paras. 76-83. This conclusion of the BIICL was also reflected in
the separate opinion of Judge Paik, para. 6, Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case.
42
M. H. Nordquist, S. N. Nandan, and S. Rosenne, eds., United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, volume II (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), p.
815. See also the Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 465.
43
Apart from hydrocarbon activities, the same question can be asked in the context
of other unilateral activities undertaken in undelimited maritime areas such as fishing,
38
39
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D. Anderson and Y. van Logchem, and Y. van Logchem writing
separately, affirm that the question of what type of conduct jeopardizes
or hampers can hardly be answered in the abstract. They argue that
the assessment of whether a particular unilateral action amounts to
jeopardizing or hampering is subjective.44 This sounds reasonable.
However, a court or tribunal, dealing with a (putative) breach of the
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, would probably apply an
objective criterion, as the Tribunal in the Guyana v. Suriname case done
(or attempted to do).45 The existence of an objective standard as to what
constitutes jeopardizing or hampering is also desirable for ensuring
the stability of private petroleum companies’ activities in undelimited
maritime areas and the investment flow.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO
JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER IN CASE LAW
The application of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is still
limited to one case, the Guyana v. Suriname case. In the Ghana v. Côte
d’Ivoire case, the SC touched upon some aspects of the obligation not
to jeopardize or hamper without bringing more clarity to the issue of
what unilateral activities are likely to jeopardize or hamper.46 In the
Guyana v. Suriname case, the Tribunal considered the obligation not
to jeopardize or hamper in the context of the legality of exploratory
drilling authorized by Guyana in an area where the maritime claims
of Guyana and Suriname overlapped. The Tribunal adopted a standard
of “(permanent) physical change to the marine environment” that in
general terms implies that activities which satisfy this standard shall
not be permitted in undelimited maritime areas and those which do not,
are to be allowed. This section discusses the question of whether the
laying submarine cables or pipelines, marine scientific research or enforcing national
legislation.
44
David Anderson and Youri van Logchem, “Rights and Obligations in Areas of
Overlapping Maritime Claims”, in: The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea,
edited by S. Jayakumar, T. Koh, R. C. Beckman, 2014, p. 206; Youri van Logchem,
“The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas”, in: The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, edited by C. Schofield, S. Lee and M.-S. Kwon, 2014, p. 186.
45
BIICL’s Report, para. 85, p. 25.
46
The Chamber explained the reasons in paras. 632 and 633 of the Judgment.
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adoption of such a standard is reasonable with respect to the obligation
not to jeopardize or hamper.
A. THE ADOPTION OF THE STANDARD OF “(PERMANENT)
PHYSICAL CHANGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT”
Although the Guyana v. Suriname case concerned exploratory
drilling in an area claimed by both parties, the Arbitral Tribunal made
statements of a general character on the question of what types of
unilateral conduct would breach the obligation not to jeopardize or
hamper.
The Tribunal distinguished two categories of unilateral activities:
those that “do not cause a physical change to the marine environment”
and those that “do cause [such a] physical change”.47 The Tribunal
further stated that the first category would “generally” not be considered
as jeopardizing or hampering the reaching a final maritime boundary
agreement, whereas the second category would have the effect of
jeopardizing or hampering.48 The Tribunal found support for this
distinction in the international jurisprudence of prescribing provisional
measures, in particular, in the Aegean Sea case.49 The Tribunal’ reliance
on the Aegean Sea case elicits the questions of whether it was appropriate
for the interpretation of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper and
whether it was in line with the current regime of provisional measures.
It is noteworthy that the Tribunal also introduced an additional
element ‘permanent’ into the phrase ‘physical change to the marine
environment’.50 Arguably, the latter phrase covers the range of activities
wider than those that falls into the definition of ‘permanent physical
change to the marine environment’.51 Thus, the word ‘permanent’
logically excludes activities that would have only a temporal physical
Guyana v. Suriname Award, paras. 467 and 480.
Ibid.
49
Guyana v. Suriname Award, paras. 468-469. Moreover, in para. 470, the Tribunal
stated that such a distinction “is consistent with other aspects of the law of the sea and
international law”.
50
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 467 and subsequently paras. 470 and 481.
51
Youri van Logchem, “The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas”,
in: The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, edited by C. Schofield, S. Lee and M.-S.
Kwon, 2014, p. 184.
47
48
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impact on the marine environment.52
Subsequently, the Tribunal gave four other definitions of activities
that are likely to jeopardize or hamper the reaching a final delimitation
agreement. They are: activities with a risk of “physical damage to the
seabed or subsoil”;53 activities that “might affect the other party’s rights
in a permanent manner”;54 “activities having a permanent physical
impact on the marine environment”;55 and activities that “might cause
permanent damage to the marine environment”.56
It is apparent that activities affecting the rights of the parties in
a permanent way stands out from activities having a (permanent)
physical change or damage to, or have a (permanent) physical impact
on, the marine environment. While activities within the latter category
are broadly similar, although they differ as to the degree of permanency
or otherwise of their adverse effects, activities in the first category
are conceptually quite different.57 However, as discussed below, all
definitions employed by the Tribunal relate to the provisional measures
stage and are the necessary requirements for the prescription of
provisional measures. Thus, contrary to what the Tribunal stated about
the difference between the thresholds, it actually applied a standard
higher than that applicable under articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the
UNCLOS in relation to jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of a
final agreement. Therefore, one can conclude that the standard adopted
in the Guyana v. Suriname case is too strict in determining whether the
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper has been violated.
Arguably, the question of whether a particular activity jeopardizes
or hampers the reaching of a final delimitation agreement should be
examined not on the basis of its physical effects on the seabed or
subsoil, but on the basis of its potential adverse effects on the reaching
of such agreement. Moreover, as further discussed in section V (D), the
Ibid.
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 469.
54
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 470.
55
Ibid.
56
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 481.
57
Youri van Logchem, “The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas”,
in: The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, edited by C. Schofield, S. Lee and M.-S.
Kwon, 2014, pp. 184-185; BIICL’s Report, para. 88, p. 25.
52
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requirement of (permanent) physical damage does not seem to be the
only applicable in assessing a request for provisional measures.
B. THE MEANING OF THE STANDARD OF “(PERMANENT)
PHYSICAL CHANGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT”
Under the Tribunal’s reasoning, the standard of “(permanent)
physical change to the marine environment” appears to be decisive in
identifying activities that may jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a
final agreement on delimitation. The Tribunal did not clarify the meaning
of this standard. However, it is reasonable to assume that the Tribunal
meant unilateral activities that may result in a (permanent) modification
of a physical character of the marine environment and its components,
including the seabed and subsoil. It is notable that the Tribunal defined
the marine environment as the object to which physical damage shall
not be caused and has thereby broadened the scope of the criterion used
by the ICJ in the Aegean Sea Order.58 The Aegean Sea Order refers only
to “the seabed or subsoil or to their natural resources”.59
The Tribunal further explained the adoption of the standard by the
fact that activities having a (permanent) physical change to the marine
environment might alter the status quo60 or prejudice the position of a
party in a delimitation dispute.61
However, the Tribunal’s explanation is not quite clear. For example,
modern seismic exploration techniques can provide with an effective
means of assessing the resource potential of the continental shelf and
can reliably inform a state what parts of an undelimited maritime area
are potentially rich in hydrocarbon resources.62 In an analysis of the
See section V (C) in detail.
Aegean Sea Order, para. 30.
60
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘the status quo’ as “the existing state of
affairs” (in Latin, the meaning is ‘the state in which’). Therefore, changing the status
quo means an act through which the situation, as it currently exists, may alter.
61
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 480.
62
Stephen Fietta, “Annex VII arbitration under UN Convention of the Law of the
Sea – interstate dispute over territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf boundaries – primacy of equidistance line – circumstances justifying other
methods – scope of duty to reach interim agreements and not to jeopardize or hinder
final agreements – implications for hydrocarbon exploration”, American Journal of
International Law, volume 102, 1 January 2008, p. 127.
58
59
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Guyana v. Suriname Award, Stephen Fietta has emphasized that:
Unilateral seismic exploration could, therefore, in some
circumstances, significantly alter the status quo as regards the
comparative levels of knowledge of two neighboring states about the
value of all (or part) of a disputed maritime area. Such a disequilibrium
in knowledge between two states could, in many cases, make a final
delimitation agreement more difficult to obtain.63
Thus, while seismic exploration could somehow change the status
quo or affect the outcome of delimitation negotiations, this activity
is unlikely to cause any permanent physical change to the marine
environment.
C. HYDROCARBON ACTIVITIES THAT (ARE LIKELY TO)
FALL UNDER THE SCOPE OF THE STANDARD
In the view of the Tribunal, seismic exploration is not a type of
activity that might lead to a (permanent) physical change or damage
to the marine environment and, therefore, “should be permissible in
a disputed area”.64 It is important to emphasize here that the Tribunal
made this statement against the background that neither state had raised
an objection to seismic testing authorized by the other State in the area
of overlapping claims.65 The Tribunal thus arrived at the conclusion
that “in the circumstances at hand”, unilateral seismic testing conducted
by a party in the disputed area is not inconsistent with its obligation not
to jeopardize or hamper.66 Following the logic of the Tribunal, it could
be argued that in certain circumstances, unilateral seismic exploration
can nonetheless constitute a breach of the obligation not to jeopardize
or hamper. The main question is what these circumstances are. Even
assuming that the legality of seismic exploration in an undelimited
area is called into question, it is very unlikely that this activity would
satisfy the standard of permanent physical change or damage to the
Ibid. Stephen Fietta has repeated his opinion during the Conference (22 July 2016)
launched the BIICL’s Report, Report of Conference, p. 30. David Anderson, however,
did not agree that seismic surveys could constitute jeopardizing or hampering since
seismic information is not very useful, Ibid.
64
Guyana v. Suriname Award, paras. 467 and 481.
65
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 481.
66
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 481.
63
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marine environment67 and, thereby, would not amount to a breach
of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. Therefore, it remains
unclear why the Tribunal, instead of adopting a uniform standard that
unilateral seismic activity by its very definition is allowed in disputed
maritime areas, whatever the circumstances, used the phrase ‘should be
permissible’.68
Saying that seismic testing does not involve any physical modification
of the continental shelf and its natural resources, it could nevertheless
be argued that this activity may have (although not permanent) physical
effects on the marine environment (for example, sonic waves can
negatively impact on the living marine resources, i.e., cause a change
of fish migration routes).69
As regards exploratory drilling, the Tribunal declared that “some
exploratory drilling might cause permanent damage to the marine
environment”.70 However, the Tribunal did not clarify what kind of
exploratory drilling is likely to fall into this category. It nevertheless
appears reasonable to assume that any exploratory drilling could
result in an irreversible physical change to the continental shelf and,
hence, should not be permissible in the absence of either a delimitation
agreement or a provisional arrangement of a practical nature.
The Tribunal abstained from concluding as to whether unilateral
exploratory drilling authorized by Guyana in the disputed maritime area
was consistent with that State’s obligation not to jeopardize or hamper
and merely alluded to remedies envisaged by Part XV and Annex
VII of the UNCLOS.71 However, it appears that the authorization of
concession holders to carry out exploratory drilling in the disputed area
was considered by the Tribunal as an act that jeopardized or hampered
the reaching of a final delimitation treaty. Whereas the Tribunal held that
Youri van Logchem, “The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas”,
in: The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, edited by C. Schofield, S. Lee and M.-S.
Kwon, 2014, pp. 184-185.
68
Ibid.
69
See, for example, Constantinos Yiallourides, “Oil and Gas Development in Disputed Waters Under UNCLOS”, UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, volume 5
(1), 2016, p. 79.
70
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 481 (emphasis added).
71
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 482.
67
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Suriname breached its obligation to make every effort not to jeopardize
or hamper the reaching of a final agreement using a threat of force
against Guyana’s exploratory drilling, it also concluded that Guyana
violated the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.72 It is logical to infer
that unilateral exploratory drilling of Guyana was the reason for the
latter statement. One possible explanation of the Tribunal’s hesitation
might be that the Tribunal decided to attribute the area where Guyana’s
drilling took place to Guyana.73
Unlike seismic exploration and some exploratory drilling, the
Tribunal stated that unilateral exploitation of oil and gas resources in
a disputed area would undoubtedly jeopardize or hamper the reaching
of a final agreement.74 Although neither Guyana nor Suriname had
conducted exploitation of hydrocarbon reservoirs in the disputed area,
the Tribunal found that such activities are to be prohibited, since they
always lead to a permanent physical change to the marine environment.75
V. THE ROLE OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CLARIFYING
THE CONTENT OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO
JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER
This section addresses the role of provisional measures in the
interpretation of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. Moreover,
this section assists in understanding of what types of petroleum activities
may justify the prescription of provisional measures.
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REGIME OF
PROVISIONAL MEASURES AND THE OBLIGATION
NOT TO JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER
The power to prescribe provisional measures is given, for example,
to the ICJ and the ITLOS under provisions set forth in their constituent
instruments.76 There are also several requirements that must be met in
order for these judicial bodies to exercise this power. The next section
72
73
74
75
76

Guyana v. Suriname Award, paras. 486 and 488 (3).
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 451.
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 467.
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 467.
Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and article 25 of the ITLOS Statute.
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of addresses these requirements. Although the regime of provisional
measures is of a special nature, the legal requirements developed by
international courts and tribunals for prescribing provisional measures
may nevertheless provide some assistance in interpreting the obligation
not to jeopardize or hamper. In the Guyana v. Suriname case, the
Tribunal heavily relied on the Aegean Sea case’s Order of provisional
measures when applying articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS.77
The Tribunal underlined that the “exceptional” power to prescribe
provisional measures is triggered only when activities carried out
in disputed maritime areas might cause irreparable prejudice to the
rights of the parties.78 However, the Tribunal stated that cases dealing
with the prescription of provisional measures are informative as to
what type of activities “should be permissible” in disputed areas
pending a delimitation agreement or a provisional arrangement.79 It
automatically means that the informative value of provisional measures
is also contained in explaining of what activities are to be prohibited
in disputed maritime areas. The Tribunal further held that activities
in respect to which the prescription of provisional measures would
be justified, “would easily meet the lower threshold of hampering or
jeopardizing the reaching of a final agreement” on delimitation.80 In
other words, the Tribunal characterized the threshold for prescribing
provisional measures as being higher than the threshold for identifying
activities that jeopardize or hamper under the meaning of paragraph
3. Despite of this observation, the criteria that guided the Tribunal in
its analysis of whether a breach of the obligation not to jeopardize or
hamper had occurred were those “used by international courts and
tribunals in assessing a request for [provisional] measures, notably the
risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil”.81 Hence, it is difficult
to understand the extent to which the obligation not to jeopardize or
hamper actually diverges from the regime of provisional measures.82
Guyana v. Suriname Award, paras. 468-469. A similar approach has been adopted
by a number of legal scholars long before the Award, see Lagoni, pp. 365-366, Miyoshi, Ong, pp. 798-799.
78
Guyana v. Suriname Award, para. 469.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Youri van Logchem, “The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas”,
77
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Moreover, it leaves open the question of whether activities that would
not meet the standard for prescribing provisional measures, can
nevertheless be regarded as jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of
a final agreement.
While the Tribunal blurred the line between the obligation not
to jeopardize or hamper and the regime of provisional measures, the
practice of prescribing provisional measures seems to maintain this
division watertight. It clearly follows from the Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire
case where the Special Chamber made no mention of articles 74 (3) and
84 (3) in its Order, although both parties did so in their submissions.
One possible explanation might be that the Chamber considered these
articles irrelevant in the context of provisional measures. Moreover,
the circumstances surrounding the Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case differ
significantly from those in the Guyana v. Suriname case.
Thus, the conditions for prescribing provisional measures could
contribute to the clarification of the content of the obligation not to
jeopardize or hamper. The subsequent section examines the question of
which requirements of provisional measures might be applicable to the
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.
B. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO THE OBLIGATION NOT
TO JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER
The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals establishes
that several legal conditions must be met in order to prescribe provisional
measures. The first prerequisite for prescribing provisional measures is
that the relevant court or tribunal must satisfy itself that it has prima
facie jurisdiction over the dispute.83 Once prima facie jurisdiction
is established, the objectives pursued by a requested party shall be
considered.
The next two legal conditions under which a court or tribunal can
in: The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, edited by C. Schofield, S. Lee and M.-S.
Kwon, 2014, p. 187-188.
83
See, for example, Application of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional
Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, para. 17.
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exercise its power to prescribe provisional measures are intimately
intertwined. One is the requirement of urgency and the other is the
requirement of a risk that irreparable prejudice might be caused to the
rights of the parties to the dispute before a final decision on the merits is
delivered. Both the ICJ and the ITLOS are of the view that provisional
measures may be prescribed only if there is “a real and imminent risk
that irreparable prejudice may be caused to the rights of the parties to
the dispute”.84 Interestingly, neither the ICJ Statute nor article 290 of the
UNCLOS refers to the concept of irreparable prejudice. Nevertheless,
under the regime of provisional measures, this concept is generally
understood as a harm that cannot be fully compensated by way of
financial reparations. The standard of urgency implies that there is “the
need to avert a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be
caused to [the] rights at issue before the final decision is delivered”.85
The next legal requirement, which shall be fulfilled for the
prescription of provisional measures, is that the provisional measures
requested by a party must be linked to the rights it claims.86 Apart from
the already mentioned requirements, recently both the ICJ and the ITLOS
have started to apply a new standard: the standard of plausibility.87 The
See, for example, Application of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional
Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, para. 89.
85
International Court of Justice, Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the
San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica); International Court of Justice Certain
Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua,
Provisional Measures, Order of 13 December 2013, ICJ Reports 2013, para. 25 and
International Tribunal on The Law of The Sea, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of
the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean, Order of 25 April 2015, para. 42.
86
International Court of Justice, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the
Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March
2011, para. 54; International Tribunal on The Law of The Sea Dispute Concerning
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire), Order of 25 April 2015, para. 63.
87
For the first time, this requirement was included in the case between Belgium v.
Senegal, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, Order of 28
May 2009, para. 57. Subsequently, in other Orders indicated by the ICJ. At the ITLOS, the requirement of plausibility was for the first time applied in the Ghana v. Côte
d’Ivoire case and subsequently in the Enrica Lexie case.
84
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application of the plausibility test means that prior to the prescription
of provisional measures, a court or tribunal has to satisfy itself that the
rights which a party claims on the merits and seeks to preserve are at
least plausible.88
The regime of provisional measures has been established and [and
constantly develops] in order to preserve the potential rights of the
parties to a dispute, pending a final decision on the merits. Similarly,
the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is intended to confine
activities for the purpose of protecting the putative rights of each party,
pending a final delimitation.89 Therefore, it could be argued that some
requirements existing in the context of provisional measures may apply
by analogy to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. There are two
requirements that directly aim at protecting the rights: the requirement
of irreparable prejudice and the requirement of plausibility. The first
requirement seems to be the most applicable to the obligation not to
jeopardize or hamper.
Against this background, the statement of the Tribunal in the
Guyana v. Suriname case can be recalled. The Tribunal held that
activities that would satisfy the condition of irreparable prejudice,
would automatically constitute a violation of the obligation not to
jeopardize or hamper.90 The following section considers the question of
what kinds of hydrocarbon activities are likely to result in irreversible
prejudice to the rights of parties to a delimitation dispute. Nevertheless,
as noted above, it is important to bear in mind that even if the activities
do not involve a risk of irreparable prejudice, they might have the effect
of jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of a delimitation agreement.
As regards the second requirement, its incorporation into the
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper would significantly limit
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and
Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean, Order of 25 April 2015, para. 58¸ International
Court of Justice, Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional
Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, para. 64.
89
Virginia Commentary, Volume II (Martinus Nijhoff), 1993, p. 984. This has been
repeated in the BIICL’s Report, para. 124, p. 36.
90
Guyana v. Suriname, para. 469.
88
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the scope this obligation. In addition to the fact that the plausibility
requirement is very controversial and vague, it seems to be impractical
to link the application of the obligation to the degree of plausibility of
the potential rights claimed by States over a maritime area.91
The content of the requirement of irreparable prejudice is examined
by the example of two provisional measures orders: in the Aegean Sea
case and in the Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case. Similar to the Guyana v.
Suriname case, these Orders deal with the issue of certain hydrocarbon
activities undertaken unilaterally in areas of overlapping maritime
claims.
C. THE ORDER IN THE AEGEAN SEA CASE
In the course of litigation on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case,
Greece requested the ICJ to indicate provisional measures in respect
to unilateral seismic exploration authorized by Turkey in areas of the
continental shelf claimed by both countries. In particular, Greece sought
provisional measures requiring Turkey to refrain from all exploration
activity or any scientific research within the disputed areas in order to
preserve the sovereign rights of Greece to research, explore and exploit
the continental shelf appertaining to it.92
The ICJ declined to indicate the provisional measures requested by
Greece, citing three reasons. First, Greece made no claim that seismic
exploration undertaken by Turkey – although it required small explosions
underwater for the purpose of sending sound waves through the seabed
to obtain relevant information concerning its geophysical structure –
involved “any risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil or to
their natural resources”.93 Second, Turkish seismic exploration was
of a transitory character and did not involve “the establishment of
installations on or above the seabed of the continental shelf”.94 Third,
Turkey did not embark upon operations involving “actual appropriation
or other use of the natural resources” located in the disputed areas of
the continental shelf.95
91
92
93
94
95

The counter-argument is presented in the BIICL’s Report, paras. 131-133, p. 39.
Aegean Sea Order, paras. 2 and 15.
Aegean Sea Order, para. 30
Ibid.
Ibid.
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The ICJ reaffirmed that its power to indicate provisional measures
is triggered only when the circumstances of a case reveal that there
is a risk of an irreparable prejudice to the rights of the parties in a
dispute.96 However, the Court found that Turkish seismic exploration
in the disputed areas constituted no risk of irreparable prejudice to the
rights claimed by Greece.97 The ICJ held that the damage caused by the
acquisition of information on the natural resources of the disputed areas
was compensable, even if the Court, in its judgement on the merits,
would find that these areas belonged to Greece.98 Judge Stassinopoulos,
in his dissenting opinion, argued that the gathering of information
regarding the resource potential of the disputed areas and its possible
disclosure created a risk of irreparable harm to the rights of Greece.99
His argument sounds reasonable, particularly in light of the Order in the
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case. Although the Order is subject to scrutiny
in the next section, it is worth noting that the Special Chamber of the
ITLOS has applied an approach slightly different from that of the ICJ in
the Aegean Sea case.100
The ICJ’s reasoning raises the question of whether the Court
would have reached a different conclusion, had Greece made a claim
concerning the harmful nature of Turkish seismic exploration. The
wording of paragraph 30 seems to imply that if Greece would have
provided sufficient material to show that Turkish activity had entailed
a risk of physical harm to the marine environment, it would, arguably,
have warranted the indication of provisional measures under article
41 of the ICJ Statute.101 Against this background, it is important to
emphasize that the Court by no means focused on the environmental
component of seismic exploration. At the time when the ICJ considered
the request of Greece, the UNCLOS was not yet adopted. Hereby, the
Court was guided solely by the content of article 41 of the ICJ Statute,
Aegean Sea Order, paras. 25 and 32.
Aegean Sea Order, para. 33.
98
Aegean Sea Order, para. 33. However, the case was not decided on the merits, as
the ICJ found that it lacked jurisdiction.
99
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stassinopoulos, p. 38.
100
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire Order, paras. 95 and 108 (b).
101
Aegean Sea Order, para. 30: “no complaint has been made that this form of seismic
exploration involves any risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil or to their
natural resources”.
96
97

179

Unilateral Hydrocarbon Activities In Undelimited Maritime Areas

which does not include the protection of the marine environment as its
object.
The other conclusion that follows from the wording of paragraph 30
is that activities involving the establishment of installations or the actual
exploitation of natural resources of a disputed maritime area are likely
to be viewed as prejudicing in an irreparable manner. Although Turkey
conducted no such activities in the disputed areas, it could nevertheless
be assumed that if it had been the case, the Court would have been able
to exercise its power to indicate provisional measures.
Thus, Turkish seismic activities did not meet the condition
of irreparable prejudice for the granting of provisional measures.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, in paragraph 32, the Court
clearly acknowledged that seismic exploration conducted by Turkey
without the consent of Greece could possibly cause a prejudice (although
not irreparable) to the exclusive exploration rights of the latter, should
the ICJ uphold the claims of Greece on the merits. This suggests that
even if such a prejudice would not count as ‘irreparable’, it could be
argued that unilateral seismic exploration in a disputed maritime area
can nevertheless be categorized as jeopardizing or hampering. As noted
above, in respect of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, the
threshold should be lower than the threshold justifying the prescription
of provisional measures.
D. THE ORDER IN THE GHANA V. CÔTE D’IVOIRE CASE
1. Background to the Case
In accordance with a Special Agreement concluded on 3 December
2014, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire agreed to submit a dispute concerning
delimitation of their maritime boundary to a Special Chamber of the
ITLOS.102 In the course of the litigation, Côte d’Ivoire filed a request
for the prescription of provisional measures under article 290 (1) of the
UNCLOS with the Special Chamber.103
Special Agreement and Notification, available https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/X001_special_agreement.pdf
103
Côte d’Ivoire’s request for the prescription of provisional measures under article
290 (1) of the UNCLOS, 27 February 2015, available https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/
itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Request_prov_measures_trans102

180

Natalia Ermolina

In its request, Côte d’Ivoire raised the issue of unilateral exploration
and exploitation activities undertaken by Ghana in an area of overlapping
claims.104 As indicated in the request, activities authorized by Ghana
had already gone beyond simple seismic survey of the disputed area.105
Ghana permitted a number of drilling operations and even moved to the
exploitation phase.106 Therefore, Côte d’Ivoire requested that Ghana be
ordered, inter alia, to cease all ongoing oil exploration and exploitation
activities in the disputed area and abstain from issuing any new permits
for oil exploration and exploitation in this area.107
In sum, the Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case appears to be unusual,
although not unprecedented, in terms of the significant exploration and
investment had occurred in the disputed area before the dispute was
submitted to the Tribunal.108 The reason for this is that according to
Ghana, it has acted in the belief that the Parties have mutually accepted
and applied a boundary line between them, and that for more than 40
years (until 2009), Côte d’Ivoire did not object hydrocarbon activities of
Ghana and did not inform Ghana of the existence of a different position
concerning the delimitation issue.109
According to article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS, pending a final
decision on the merits, the Special Chamber has the power to prescribe
provisional measures in order to preserve the respective rights of
the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine
environment. Therefore, a request for the prescription of provisional
measures shall at least be based on one of the legal grounds mentioned in
lation_Reg.pdf
104
This area is defined in paras. 60 of the Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire Order.
105
Côte d’Ivoire’s request, paras. 10, 23-27.
106
Ibid.
107
Côte d’Ivoire’s request, para. 54.
108
Nigel Bankes, “ITLOS Special Chamber Prescribes Provisional Measures with
Respect to Oil and Gas Activities in the Disputed Area in Case Involving Ghana
and Côte d’Ivoire”, The JCLOS Blog, 12 May 2015. Available at https://site.uit.
no/jclos/2015/05/12/itlos-special-chamber-prescribes-provisional-measures-withrespect-to-oil-and-gas-activities-in-disputed-area-in-case-involving-ghana-and-cotedivoire/
109
Written Statement of Ghana, 25 March 2015, Section I, subsection B https://www.
itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/Vol._I_-_Written_
Statement_of_Ghana_FINAL.pdf
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article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS. Côte d’Ivoire in its request argued that
provisional measures had to be prescribed since there was the need both
to preserve the respective rights and to protect the marine environment.
Côte d’Ivoire claimed that provisional measures were required in order
to preserve three categories of its “exclusive sovereign rights … arising
under the UNCLOS”, namely:
1) “the right to explore for and exploit the resources of Côte
d’Ivoire’s seabed and the subsoil thereof by carrying out
seismic studies and drilling, and installing major submarine
infrastructures” in the disputed area;
2) “the right to exclusive access to confidential information” about
Côte d’Ivoire’s natural resources in the disputed area;
3) “the right to select the oil companies to conduct exploration and
exploitation operations and freely to determine the terms and
conditions in its own best interest and in accordance with its
own requirements with respect to oil and the environment”.110
Moreover, Côte d’Ivoire also alleged that oil exploration and
exploitation activities authorized by Ghana in the disputed area were
causing serious harm to the marine environment.111 This allegation was
used in support of Côte d’Ivoire’s claim under the protection of the
marine environment vein of article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS.
2. Changes Introduced by the Chamber Into the Irreparability
Requirement
When prescribing provisional measures, the Chamber stated that all
legal conditions necessary for granting of provisional measures112 had
been met. This subsection examines the changes, which the Chamber
made with respect to the requirement of irreparable prejudice.
In its Order, the Chamber has confirmed that it prescribes provisional
measures only when there is a real and imminent risk of causing
irreparable prejudice to the rights of the parties to a dispute before a
Côte d’Ivoire’s request for the prescription of provisional measures under article
290 (1) of the UNCLOS, 27 February 2015, para. 53; Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order,
paras. 44-49.
111
Côte d’Ivoire’s request for the prescription of provisional measures under article
290 (1) of the UNCLOS, 27 February 2015, paras. 39-53; Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order,
para. 50.
112
Section V (B) considers the conditions for the prescription of provisional measures.
110
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final decision on the merits is handed down.113 The Chamber held that a
risk of irreparable prejudice exists where, in particular, “activities result
in significant and permanent modification of the physical character”
of the disputed area, and where “such modification cannot be fully
compensated by financial reparations”.114
Côte d’Ivoire claimed that the continuation of Ghana’s unilateral
activities in the contested area would cause irreversible damage to its
sovereign rights.115 Ghana in its reply stated that the harm claimed by
Côte d’Ivoire cannot be regarded as “irreparable” because it might be
addressed through an appropriate award of damages and by delivery of
information acquired by Ghana.116
The Chamber agreed with Ghana that “the alleged loss of the
revenues derived from oil production could be the subject of adequate
compensation in the future”.117 However, the Chamber took the view
that the ongoing exploration and exploitation activities conducted by
Ghana in the disputed area were of a distinctive character. Such activities
were likely to “result in a modification of the physical characteristics
of the continental shelf”118 and “any compensation awarded would
never be able to restore the status quo ante in respect of the seabed and
subsoil.”119
As regards the exclusive right to access to confidential information
about the natural resources of the continental shelf, the Special Chamber
took into account Ghana’s statement that the gathered information on
the natural resources of the disputed area will be duly recorded and that
Ghana will be able to provide this information to Côte d’Ivoire, if it will
be required to do so at the conclusion of the dispute.120 Although the
Chamber accepted the undertaking given by Ghana, it also held that the
right claimed by Côte d’Ivoire required protection.121
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire Order, para. 74.
Ibid., para. 89.
Ibid., paras. 76-81.
Ibid., paras. 82-87.
Ibid., para. 80.
Ibid., para. 88.
Ibid., para. 90.
Ibid., paras. 92 and 93.
Ibid., para. 94.
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The Chamber stated that “the acquisition and use of information
about the resources of the disputed area would create a risk of irreversible
prejudice to the rights of Côte d’Ivoire”, if the Chamber, in its judgement
on the merits, will rule that all or any part of the disputed area pertains
to Côte d’Ivoire.122 Therefore, dealing with a matter similar to what
was raised in the Aegean Sea case, the Chamber arrived at the opposite
conclusion.123 The Chamber’s finding seems to imply that the condition
of irreparable prejudice can be met even if there is no risk of physical
change to the seabed and subsoil. The support for this can also be found
in the formulation of paragraph 89, which by the inclusion of the adverb
‘in particular’, indicates that the requirement of physical change is not
the only one to satisfy the condition of irreparable prejudice.
In sum, the Chamber accepted that the imminent risk of irreparable
prejudice to the sovereign and exclusive rights of Côte d’Ivoire
existed.124 In other words, it concluded that the exploration and
exploitation activities planned by Ghana in the disputed area required
prescribing provisional measures. At the same time, the Chamber
prescribed provisional measures different from those requested by
Côte d’Ivoire. In doing so, the Chamber relied upon two main aspects:
the preservation of Ghana’s rights and the protection of the marine
environment. The Chamber stated that in the event that Ghana would be
ordered to suspend its activities, especially in respect of which drilling
had already taken place, it would “cause prejudice to the rights claimed
by Ghana and create an undue burden on it” and it could also result in a
“harm to the marine environment.”125
Such a two-pronged approach can be explained by the wording
of article 290 of the UNCLOS. Article 290 aims at preserving the
respective rights of both parties to a dispute, not only the rights of
Ibid., para. 95.
Section V (C).
124
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire Order, para. 96.
125
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire Order, paras. 99-101. It is interesting to note that the Chamber, when referring to a risk of prejudice to Ghana’s rights, did not consider it as “irreparable”. As regards the second argument against the suspension of Ghana’s activities in the disputed area, one can wonder why the Chamber regarded environmental
harm resulting from the suspension of ongoing activities as more serious than that
from the continuation of these activities.
122
123
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the requesting party. Hence, the Special Chamber attempted to reach
a delicate balance between the competing rights of the parties under
the regime of provisional measures.126 The special circumstances of the
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case should also be borne in mind. It seems
that the Chamber took into account the fact that Côte d’Ivoire was
not particularly active to contest Ghana’s petroleum activities in the
disputed area before 2009.
VI. FINAL REMARKS
The Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case is the second case, following the
Guyana v. Suriname case, in which an international judicial body has
dealt with the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper in the context
of unilateral hydrocarbon activities in disputed maritime areas.
Unfortunately, the Chamber did not address the reasonableness of the
standard of “(permanent) physical change to the marine environment”
developed by the Tribunal in the Guyana v. Suriname case. Thereby,
this standard is still the only applicable in identifying what hydrocarbon
activities would have the effect of jeopardizing or hampering. When
adopting the standard of “(permanent) physical change to the marine
environment”, the Tribunal heavily relied on the criterion laid down
by the ICJ in the Aegean Sea case. In the view of the ICJ, activities
that pose a risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil, or to their
natural resources might cause irreparable prejudice to the rights, which
are the subject of a dispute.
The Tribunal modified the ICJ’s criterion by including such additional
elements as ‘permanent’ and ‘the marine environment’. Nevertheless,
one can agree with a number of legal scholars that the benchmark used
by the Tribunal was not fully justified with respect to the obligation
not to jeopardize or hamper.127 The Tribunal should have applied a less
Yoshifumi Tanaka, “Unilateral Exploration and Exploitation of Natural Resources
in Disputed Areas: A Note on the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order of 25 April 2015 before the Special Chamber of ITLOS”, Ocean Development & International Law, 46,
2015, p. 326; Stephen Fietta and Robin Cleverly, A Practitioner’s Guide to Maritime
Boundary Delimitation, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 136.
127
Youri van Logchem, “The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas”,
in: The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, edited by C. Schofield, S. Lee and M.-S.
126
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strict threshold for finding a violation of the obligation not to jeopardize
or hamper, rather than the one that is sufficient for triggering the power
to prescribe provisional measures.
Moreover, as discussed above, the Chamber in the Ghana v. Côte
d’Ivoire case seems to have changed the content of the irreparability
requirement. In the context of the right to information about resources of
the disputed maritime area, it appears that the Chamber did not consider
the standard of permanent physical change to the marine environment as
a necessary condition to meet the irreparable prejudice requirement.128
Thus, the formula provided by the Tribunal in the Guyana v. Suriname
case should be revisited in light of the Order in the Ghana v. Côte
d’Ivoire case.
If one assumes that the standard of permanent physical damage is
indeed a rule of international law defining what hydrocarbon activities
are or are not consistent with the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper,
the question is what phases (or techniques used in conducting) of the
exploration and exploitation are most likely to come under the scope of
this standard. The standard would definitely apply to activities involving
the placement of permanent installations and structures on the seabed, or
activities aimed at extracting of petroleum resources located in areas of
overlapping maritime claims. As follows from the discussions in section
IV, any drilling operation entails a risk of permanent physical damage to
the seabed and subsoil and, therefore, would likely to be contrary to the
duty not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching a final delimitation. The
answer to the question of the applicability of the mentioned standard
to seismic testing is less certain. Seismic exploration would hardly
meet such a (unreasonably) high threshold for finding a breach of the
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.
It is important to bear in mind that this article concludes that for
finding a violation of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, the
application of the standard of “(permanent) physical change to the marine
environment” is unjustified. The article argues that even if that standard
Kwon, 2014, p. 191; Stephen Fietta, his comments on the BIICL’s Report, pp. 21-22,
available at https://www.biicl.org/documents/1296_obligations_of_states_in_undelimited_maritime_areas_final_event_report.pdf?showdocument=1
128
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire Order, para. 95.
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cannot be met in the context of a particular hydrocarbon activity, it does
not mean that this activity is in line with the obligation not to jeopardize
or hamper. As noted above, the emphasis should be placed not on the
physical effects of a hydrocarbon activity on the marine environment
and its components, but on its effects on the process of reaching a final
delimitation agreement between neighboring states. Thus, it could
be argued that even seismic surveys might constitute jeopardizing or
hampering. The seismic information may advantage the Party having
access to it in delimitation negotiations. In each case, a State claiming
that its neighbor’s hydrocarbon operations in an undelimited maritime
area are contrary to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper would
need to substantiate the effects of these operations upon the delimitation
of the maritime boundary between them.
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